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Lingering Hazardous Chemicals: Missouri’s Step Toward
Accountability in the Face of Corporate Market Ubiquity
Clair v. Monsanto Co., 412 S.W.3d 295 (2013)
Adam Ellis

I. INTRODUCTION
This case note focuses on the legal ramifications stemming from the
use, disposal, and environmental impacts of a chemical known as
polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”), a product introduced to the United States
in the late 1920s by Monsanto Company.1 PCBs were mainly used as
cooling and insulating fluids for industrial transformers and capacitors and
were manufactured and released into the environment from the 1920s until
their ban in 1979, but their persistent and toxic nature continue to have
adverse impacts.2 For example, there are still measurable amounts of PCB in
feathers of birds currently held in museums.3
Active research spanning fifty years indicates that PCBs are
carcinogens having the potential to adversely impact the environment.4
However, between 1930 and 1977, Respondent, Monsanto Company, the sole
1

Karylyn Black Kaley, Jim Carlisle, David Siegel & Julio Salinas, Health Concerns
and Environmental Issues with PVC-Containing Building Materials in Green
Buildings, C ALIFORNIA E NVIRONEMTNAL P ROTECTION A GENCY (Oct. 2006),
http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Publications/Documents/GreenBuilding%5C43106016.p
df.
2
Health Effects of PCBs., U.S. E NVIRONMENTAL P ROTECTION A GENCY (Oct. 2006),
http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Publications/Documents/GreenBuilding%5C43106016.p
df.
3
Robert Riseborough & Virginia Brodine, More Letters in the Wind, E NVIRONMENT:
S CIENCE AND P OLICY FOR S USTAINABLE D EVELOPMENT , Volume 12, Issue 1 (1970).
4
Knut Breivik, Andy Sweetman, Jozef Pacyna, & Kevin Jones,” Towards a global
historical emission inventory for selected PCB congeners – a mass balance approach”
The Science of Total Environment, 290 (1-3), 181-198 (2002) available at:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969701010750.
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producer of PCB in North America, produced over 600,000 tons of the
chemical.5 To this day, high levels of PCB pollution continue to be found in
the United States.6 This case note will focus on a recent Missouri case in
which litigants from California developed non-Hodgkins Lymphoma and
alleged that this was due to their exposure to PCB.7
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellants are three California residents who developed
lymphohematopietic cancer, also known as Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma,
allegedly due to their exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) released
into the environment by Respondent.8 PCBs are a class of chemical
compounds used in the manufacturing of capacitors, transformers, paints,
varnishes, adhesives, hydraulic fluids, and carbonless copy paper.9 PCBs
were designed to be resistant to heat and chemical breakdown, and no known
natural sources of PCBs exist in the environment.10 This resilience has
resulted in their continued presence in the environment to this day even
though their manufacture and sale were banned in the United States over
thirty years ago.11
Appellants brought action against the successor of the PCB’s
manufacturer, Pharmacia,12 alleging negligence and strict liability.13 In their
negligence claim at the trial court level, Appellants alleged that Pharmacia
was negligent in distributing and marketing various PCB products it was
5

Id.
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), I LLINOIS D EPARTMENT OF P UBLIC H EALTH
E NVIRONMENTAL F ACT S HEET (Feb. 2009),
http://www.idph.state.il.us/envhealth/factsheets/polychlorinatedbiphenyls.htm.
7
Clair v. Monsanto, 412 S.W.3d 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
8
Id.at 300.
9
Id. at 301.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Pharmecia did business under the name of Monsanto at all times relevant to this
case. In 2000, Old Monsanto merged with a subsidiary of Pharmacia and changed its
name to Pharmacia. The entity now known as Monsanto was formed in 2000 and is
defending Old Monsanto under an indemnification agreement. All further references
to Monsanto are to Old Monsanto. Id. at 300 nn.1-2.
13
Id. at 295.
6
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“aware or should have been aware of the hazards of PCBs and either knew or
should have known the PCBs would be released into the environment.”14 At
trial, Appellants used expert testimony to assert that Pharmacia knew as early
as 1938 that PCBs were toxic if given enough exposure, and that Pharmacia
had actual knowledge that many of its PCBs would be released into the
environment by third parties.15 In their strict liability claim, Appellants claim
the PCBs were “defectively designed” because the PCBs made their way into
the environment and the food chain as a result of the dumping of PCBcontaining products and the incorporation of PCBs into “open-use” products
like paints, varnishes, and adhesives.16 Appellants contend that Pharmacia’s
negligence and defective design resulted in their exposure to PCBs, which
was a substantial factor in their development of cancer.17
Pharmacia then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing against
both the negligence and strict liability claims.18 With respect to the
negligence claim, Pharmacia argued that it had “no duty to protect
[Appellants] from the conduct of downstream users of PCBs or from injuries
related to the presence of PCBs in the environment.”19 With respect to the
strict liability claim, Pharmacia asserted three different arguments.20 First,
Pharmacia argued that the Appellants “cannot prove they were harmed as a
result of an intended or foreseeable use of the product.”21 Second, Pharmacia
argued that Appellants “have no evidence as to what PCBs they were
exposed to, and therefore, the risk versus benefit analysis to determine
whether the product was defective cannot be applied.”22 Third, Pharmacia
asserted that “if the court determines there is no duty in negligence, then
there is no duty in strict liability.”23

14

Id.at 302.
Id. at 301.
16
Id. at 301-02.
17
Id. at 302.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
15
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pharmacia.24
Because the Appellants could not specify what path the PCBs took from the
manufacturer to their bloodstream nor when the PCBs in their blood was
manufactured, the trial court reasoned that Pharmacia should not owe a duty
to Appellants because it would mean Pharmacia was “an insurer of its
products for all places, times, and conditions.”25 In addition, the trial court
noted that the connection between Appellant’s injuries and Pharmacia’s
conduct was “not sufficiently close to weigh strongly in favor of imposing a
legal duty on Pharmacia, and Pharmacia could not reasonably foresee its
conduct would harm Plaintiffs.”26
The trial court further found public policy supported a holding
exempting Pharmacia from a duty for this particular category of conduct.27
Imposing this duty would be excessive, opined the trial court, because
Pharmacia would be forced to defend against a potentially “limitless pool of
plaintiffs.”28 Further, the trial court noted that there was nothing they could
do to prevent or mitigate future injuries because of the existing prevalence of
PCBs in the environment.29 As a matter of law, the trial court found that
Pharmacia owed no duty to Appellants and granted their motion for summary
judgment on the claim of negligence.30
In its judgment for the claim based on strict liability, the trial court
found, as a matter of law, that Pharmacia cannot be held strictly liable to
Appellants “for injuries caused by PCBs in the environment resulting from
the unforeseeable and unintended uses of dumping, disposal, scrapping,
recycling, incineration, and destruction of PCBs and PCB-containing
products by third parties.”31 The trial court found that Appellants “had not
and would not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 303.
30
Id.
31
Id.
25
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to find intended and foreseeable uses of PCBs were a substantial factor in
causing their injuries.”32 For these reasons, the trial court granted the
summary judgment in favor of Pharmacia on both the negligence and strict
liability claims.33
The instant court reversed and remanded.34 The Court of Appeals
found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the
negligence claim because Appellants had established that Pharmacia owed a
duty of reasonable care.35 The Court of Appeals balanced a number of
considerations, known as the “Rowland factors,”36 in determining whether
public policy clearly supported an exception from the general principle that
“everyone in California has a duty to exercise reasonable care.”37 The two
primary Rowland factors the Court of Appeals considered on the question of
legal duty were foreseeability and questions of public policy, namely, the
extent of the burden on the defendant.38 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals
found that it was generally foreseeable that the design, manufacture, and
distribution of PCBs could result in the type of injuries experienced, and the
considerations of the Rowland public policy factors resulted in a finding that
Pharmacia owed a duty of care as a matter of public policy.39
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Negligence Cause of Action
The court cites to Section 1714 of the California Civil Code in
determining whether Pharmacia owed a duty to the Appellants.40
Specifically, the court quotes the pertinent portion of the statute:
32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.at 300.
35
Id. at 304.
36
Id. at 305, citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561,
564 (1968).
37
Id. at 304.
38
Id. at 305.
39
Id. at 306, 309.
40
Id. at 304.
33

383

LINGERING HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her
willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by
his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of
his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has,
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon
himself or herself.41
This portion of the statute means that everyone in California has a
general duty to exercise reasonable care.42 However, exceptions to this
general principle have been carved out when they are clearly supported by
the balancing of a number of considerations, called “the Rowland factors.”43
These include: the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the moral blame attached
to the defendant’s conduct; the extent of the burden to the defendant; the
policy of preventing future harm; the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and, the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.44
In Rowland v. Christian, a Supreme Court of California case from
1968, the plaintiff, Mr. Rowland, was a guest in the defendant, Ms.
Christian’s, home.45 The defendant had a cracked faucet handle that injured
the plaintiff’s hand upon use.46 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was
aware of the dangerous condition, and that the plaintiff’s injuries were
proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.47 The defendant admitted
she told the landlord that the faucet was defective and it should be replaced,
but defendant also alleged contributory negligence and assumption of risk,
alleging that plaintiff knew of the condition of the premises and he had
41

Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 2012).
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304.
43
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (1968).
44
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304-05.
45
Rowland, 69 Cal.2d at 110.
46
Id.
47
Id.
42
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merely failed to see the crack.48 The court laid out the general California law
on negligence as it existed then, “All persons are required to use ordinary
care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct.”49 Further,
the court noted that no exceptions to this general rule should be made unless
clearly supported by public policy.50 It is here where the Court enunciates
what are known as the Rowland factors.51
The Court in Rowland gathers case law from California’s history, and
in one fell swoop, lays out clearly the considerations a court must make when
determining if an exception to the general principle of negligence is
supported by public policy.52 These considerations, listed above, have been
cited over 6,000 times since their conception,53 including the citation in Clair
v. Monsanto. But only two factors, foreseeability and the extent of the

48

Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
50
Id. (Citing Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 229-30
(1961)). Lipman states that government officials are not personally liable for their
discretionary acts within the scope of their authority even though it is alleged that their
conduct was malicious. This is due to important policy considerations such as the
subjection of officials to the burden of a trial and to the danger that it would impair
their zeal in the performance of their functions.
51
Rowland, 69 Cal.2d at 113.
52
Rowland, at 112-13. The Court cites: Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited, 67 A.C.
228, 233, fn. 3, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 430 P.2d 68;Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal.2d 440,
443—445, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164; Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal.2d 552, 561—562, 25
Cal. Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304; Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 58 Cal.2d 368, 377, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d 185; Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 55 Cal.2d
224,229-230 (1961).; Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d 857, 863, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d
345; Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358; Wright v.
Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal.App.2d 272, 278, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812; Raymond v.
Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal.App.2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847; Prosser on Torts
(3d ed. 1964) pp. 148—151; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956) pp. 1052,
1435 et seq.
53
See Rowland v. Christian, Citing References, WESTLAW (Apr. 28, 2015, 2:58pm),
https://a.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I434dce0efad911d9bf60c1d57ebc853e/
kcCitingReferences.html?originationContext=documentTab&transitionType=CitingRe
ferences&contextData=(sc.DocLink)&docSource=410929f2fcc645d3ad851e38003d03
9c.
49
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burden to the defendant, have evolved to become the primary factors to be
considered on the question of legal duty supporting negligence liability.54
In 2004, Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. became the first
case to note the evolution of the Rowland factors into two primary
considerations.55 In Vasquez, the court clearly states that the Rowland factors
that are to be weighed in the balancing analysis will vary with each case,56
but the factors of foreseeability and the extent of burden to the defendant
“have evolved to become the primary factors considered in every case.”57
The most recent case that upholds this list of primary factors, and is cited by
the court in Clair, is the 2012 case Campbell v. Ford Motor Co.58
The courts in Campbell and Clair both cite to Cabral v. Ralphs
Grocery Co.,59 a 2011 case, explaining an important feature of the Rowland
analysis: the factors are to be evaluated at a relatively broad level of
factuality.60 Thus, as to foreseeability, as the court in Cabral put it, the
court’s task in determining duty “is not to decide whether a particular
plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular
defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the
category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the
kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed…”61
Further, the court noted a distinct difference between a determination that the
defendant did not breach the duty of ordinary care, which is for the jury to
decide in a trial, and a determination that the defendant owed the plaintiff no
duty of ordinary care to begin with, which is for the court to decide.62 If the
court finds the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of ordinary care, the jury
may consider the likelihood or foreseeability of injury in determining
54

Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305.
118 Cal.App.4th 269 (2004).
56
Id. at 280.
57
Id. at 280, n. 5.
58
206 Cal.App.4th 15, 33 (2012).
59
51 Cal.4th 764.
60
Id. at 772.
61
Id.
62
Id.
55
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whether the particular defendant’s conduct was negligent in the first place.63
A court would first have to identify the conduct of a defendant as categorical
“no duty” conduct in order to absolve the defendant of a duty of ordinary
care.64 However, once a court identifies that a category of conduct may
require a duty of ordinary care, the debate does not end there. The court still
must turn to the question of foreseeability and examine whether the other
Rowland factors justify creating a duty exception.65
B. Strict Products Liability Cause of Action
The elements of a strict products liability cause of action are: (1) a
defect in the manufacture or design of the product or a failure to warn, (2)
causation, and (3) injury.66 According to the California Supreme Court, a
product can be found defective under one of two tests: the consumer
expectations test or the risk-benefit test.67 Under the consumer expectations
test, the plaintiff must prove that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in a reasonably foreseeable
manner in order for the product to be defective in design.68 Under the riskbenefit test, two things must happen in order to prove a product is defective
in design: (1) the plaintiff must prove that the product’s design proximately
caused injury, and (2) the defendant must have failed to prove that the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design.69 The risk-benefit test is to be used when the ordinary consumer
would have difficulty knowing what to expect concerning the safety design
of a product.70 If the product embodies “excessive preventable danger,” or if
the jury finds that the risk of inherent danger in the challenged design
outweighs the benefits of such design, the product is defective in design.71

63

Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305 (citing Cabral).
Id. at 305-06.
65
Id. at 308.
66
Nelson v. Superior Court, 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 695 (2006).
67
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413, 430-32 (1978).
68
Id.
69
Id. See also, Moreno v. Fey Manufacturing Corp., 149 Cal.App.3d 23, 26-27 (1983).
70
Bates v. John Deer Co., 148 Cal.App.3d 40, 52 (1983).
71
Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 430.
64
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The jury may consider several factors in evaluating the adequacy of a
product’s design.72 These factors include “the gravity of the danger posed by
the design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical
feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from an alternative design.”73
To establish a prima facie case under strict products liability, the
plaintiff must show that his or her injury was proximately caused by the
product’s design.74 To make this showing, the plaintiff must produce
evidence showing that he or she was injured while using or coming into
contact with the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.75
The plaintiff must also show that the absence of a safety device or the nature
of the product’s design frustrated his or her ability to avoid injury.76
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing that his or her
injury was proximately caused by the product’s design, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove that the product was not defective.77 The defendant
bears the ultimate burden of proof to establish that its product was not
defective because the plaintiff’s injury resulted from misuse of the product;
this burden should be distinguished from the burden on the plaintiff making a
prima facie case.78 If the defendant shows that the plaintiff misused the
product in such a highly extraordinary, unforeseeable way, the defendant has
an affirmative defense absolving it of its wrongful conduct.79 Because a
manufacturer is required to reasonably foresee misuse of a product by a user

72

Id. at 431.
Id.
74
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305. (citing Perez v. VAS S.p.A., 188 Cal.App.4th 658, 676
(2010)).
75
Perez, 188 Cal.App.4th at 678.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Chavez v. Glock, Inc., 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1308 (2012).
73
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or a third party, the class of foreseeable uses is quite broad.80 Foreseeability
of this nature is a question for the jury.81
California case law establishes that plaintiffs involved in injury suits
for the development of cancer due to exposure to toxic chemicals must also
show, in addition to the aforementioned burdens, some threshold exposure to
the toxic chemical, and must prove that exposure was a “substantial factor
causing the illness by showing by a reasonable medical probability that the
plaintiff’s exposure contributed to the plaintiff’s risk of developing cancer.”82
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Negligence Claim
In the instant case, the Missouri Court of Appeals in the Eastern
District reviewed the granting of summary judgment de novo and applied
California law to evaluate the merits of the Appellants’ substantive claims.83
The appellate court began its analysis with the argument that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment on the Appellants’ negligence claim
brought under California law because Appellants had established Pharmacia
owed them a duty of reasonable care.84 Analyzing the California Civil Code
on Obligations Imposed by Law,85 the appellate court established that
“generally everyone in California has a duty to exercise reasonable care.”86
80

Nelson v. Superior Court, 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 698 (2006).
Chavez, 207 Cal.App.4th at 1308 (internal citations omitted).
82
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 312.
83
Id. at 304. (citing Moore ex rel. Moore v. Bi-State Development Agency, 87 S.W.3d
279, 285 (Mo.App. E.D. 2002). The Court of Appeals applied Missouri law for the
standard of review, as it noted that a forum state will always apply forum procedure.
Further, the court stated with regard to substantive law, a forum state will choose the
applicable law according to its own conflict of law doctrines. Id. For tort claims,
Missouri applies the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
Section 145 (1971). Id. Because the injuries occurred in California, the Appellants
came into contact with PCBs in California, the Appellants all reside in California, and
the parties all agree that California law applies to the substantive claims in this case,
the court applied Section 145 of the Restatement and found California law should be
used to evaluate the substantive claims.
84
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304.
85
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 2012).
86
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304.
81
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However, the appellate court noted that exceptions from this general
principle are made when public policy clearly supports the exception.87
Courts must balance a number of considerations known as the “Rowland
factors”88 to determine if public policy supports the exception from the
general rule.89 The considerations that have evolved into the two primary
Rowland factors to be considered on the question of legal duty are
foreseeability and the extent of burden to the defendant; the factors are
evaluated at a relatively broad level of factual generality.90
The appellate court continued its analysis by next examining the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.91 The court explained that its task in
determining a duty owed is to evaluate whether the “category of negligent
conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm
experienced.”92 Two different types of determinations must be distinguished
by the court when discussing foreseeability: a determination that the
defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of ordinary care, and a determination
that the defendant did not breach the duty of ordinary care.93 The former
determination is for the court to make, while the latter determination is for
the jury to make.94
Using this rule, the court reviewed the trial court’s holding that
Pharmacia did not breach the duty of ordinary care to Appellants, and found
that because the trial court made determinations on the category of conduct
that Pharmacia undertook, it incorrectly made fact-finding determinations95
87

Id.
Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.
89
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304.
90
Id. at 305 (citing Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 390 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012); Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2011)).
91
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
The factual determinations made include: that the Appellants could not specify when
the PCBs in their blood were manufactured or what path they took from the
manufacturer to each Appellant, and that it was possible the
Appellants ingested PCBs illegally dumped by third parties decades after they were
manufactured. Id. at 306.
88
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on the breach of ordinary care, instead of the duty owed.96 The appellate
court further noted that the trial court made an incorrect determination of the
category of conduct at issue; Pharmacia’s category of conduct at issue was
not protecting Appellants from the conduct of downstream users of PCBs, as
the trial court said, but the design, manufacturing, and distribution of PCBs.97
The appellate court made this finding because the actual conduct at issue
involved the design, distribution, and manufacturing of PCBs, a unique class
of chemicals resistant to environmental breakdown, and the duty to protect
Appellants from the conduct of downstream users of PCBs is too expansive.98
After determining the category of negligent conduct, the appellate
court then continued its analysis of foreseeability by determining whether the
design, distribution, and manufacture of PCBs was sufficiently likely to result
in the kind of harm experienced by the Appellants.99 Because the Rowland
factors are evaluated at a broad level of general factuality, the appellate court
found that Appellants provided sufficient evidence showing that Pharmacia
had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, distribution, and
manufacture of PCBs because it was “generally foreseeable” that this conduct
may increase the risk of developing non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.100 Because
PCBs are very stable and resistant to environmental breakdown, because
Appellants provided evidence that the presence of PCBs in the environment
resulted in an increased risk of cancer for those exposed to PCBs, and
because, given the nature of PCBs, the lapse between their creation and
Appellants’ injuries is irrelevant, specific factual questions regarding
foreseeability and proximate cause should be handled by the jury, not by a
court making determinations of duty as a matter of law, as the trial court
did.101
After determining foreseeability, the appellate court examined the
Rowland public policy factors to determine whether a duty exception still
96

Id.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 308.
97
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existed in the instant case.102 The specific question the court examined is
whether the policy of preventing future harm by imposing costs upon
Pharmacia is outweighed by undesirable consequences of allowing potential
liability or laws indicating approval of designing, distributing, and
manufacturing PCBs.103 The appellate court found no such laws indicating
approval of this conduct.104 Further, the appellate court dispelled the notion
that Pharmacia should escape liability because of the flood of litigation in St.
Louis courts and of the potentially limitless pool of possible plaintiffs, as
they were very successful in designing, distributing, and manufacturing
PCBs.105 The court opined that it would not be sound policy to allow the
mere ubiquitous nature of PCBs to preclude liability because such a finding
might allow manufacturers to avoid taking precautions to produce a safe
product as long as it made enough of the product.106 The court stated that the
imposition of a duty in this instance, while it would do little to prevent future
harm from PCBs, serves as a warning to manufacturers creating dangerous
products.107
Because Appellants sufficiently alleged the possibility of causation by
providing evidence showing Pharmacia had a duty to exercise reasonable
care in the design, manufacture, and distribution of PCBs, it was generally
foreseeable that such a category of conduct could result in the harm
experienced by Appellants.108 Evidence was also presented that PCBs in the
environment resulted in an increased risk of cancer for those exposed to
PCBs, and because the ubiquitous nature of PCBs does not preclude liability,
the appellate court found that the public policy factors in Rowland did not
persuade it that Pharmacia does not owe a duty of care.109 The appellate
court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with

102

Id.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 308-09.
106
Id. at 309.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 308-09.
109
Id.
103
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respect to Appellant’s cause of action for negligence because Appellants
established that Pharmacia owed a duty of reasonable care.110
B. Strict Liability Claim
In deciding the claim of strict liability by design defect, the appellate
court first questioned whether the post-use disposal of PCBs was foreseeable
by looking at evidence demonstrating that Pharmacia knew, or should have
known, that many of its PCBs would enter the environment through disposal
by third parties.111 The appellate court stated that the elements of a strict
products liability cause of action are “a defect in the manufacture or design of
the product or a failure to warn, causation, and injury.”112 Specifically,
Appellants must show that “the product is placed on the market; there is
knowledge that it will be used without inspection for defect; the product
proves to be defective; and the defect causes injury.”113
As for deciding whether the products containing PCBs were defective
in design, the court used the “risk-benefit test because a normal consumer
would not know what to expect concerning a safe design of a PCB.”114
Under this test, a product is defective in design if Appellants prove that the
product’s design “proximately caused injury” and Pharmacia fails to prove,
in light of the relevant factors, that on balance, “the benefits of the challenged
design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.”115 To find a
product defective in design requires a jury determination that the design
embodies “excessive preventable danger” and that the risk of danger
outweighs the benefits of such a design.116 Factors used in balancing the
risks and benefits include:
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the gravity of danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical
feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of
an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the
product and to the consumer that would result from an
alternative design.117
Once Appellants have made a prima facie showing that their injuries
were proximately caused by Pharmacia’s product design, the burden shifts to
Pharmacia to prove that its product is not defective in light of the preceding
factors.118 To make a prima facie case, Appellants must show evidence that
they were injured while using or coming into contact with the product in “an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner” and that no safety device or safe
nature of the product allowed Appellants to avoid injury.119 The appellate
court held that the trial court erred in determining that Pharmacia could not
be held strictly liable because the trial court made a fact-finder’s
determination that post-use disposal of PCBs was unforeseeable after
Appellants had made the requisite prima facie case.120
Next, the appellate court decided whether a genuine issue of material
fact existed. Appellants introduced expert testimony regarding Pharmacia’s
internal documents showing that it knew or should have known its PCBs
would be improperly disposed of by third parties.121 Appellants also
introduced laboratory analysis showing that they had elevated levels of PCBs
in their bloodstream.122 Further expert testimony described how the risk of
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma increased the more prevalent PCBs are in the
blood, and because Appellants’ blood levels show that PCBs were a
substantial factor in their development of lymphoma, the appellate court held
that Appellants did in fact show that there is a genuine issue of material fact
117
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of whether their injuries were caused by a foreseeable misuse of PCBcontaining products.123
Next, the appellate court opined on the trial court’s second finding for
Pharmacia that Appellants could not prove whether the PCBs in their blood
were from other PCB sources or “open-use” products containing PCBs.124
The appellate court, in determining whether the sources of the PCBs
mattered, relied on a California case125 rule that Appellants must “show some
threshold exposure to PCBs and must prove that exposure was a substantial
factor causing the illness.”126 Appellants can show this by introducing a
“reasonable medical probability” that their exposure to PCBs contributed to
their risk of developing cancer.127 Appellants brought in evidence showing
that their blood contained elevated levels of PCB.128 They further brought in
various experts to testify to internal documents that show Pharmacia should
have known that its open-use PCBs would result in substantial releases of
those PCBs into the environment.129 Further evidence by Appellants
indicated that Pharmacia knew open-use PCB products were the “major
source” of PCBs entering the environment.130
The appellate court looked to Appellants’ evidence to decide whether
a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether their injuries were
caused by foreseeable and intended uses of open-use PCB-containing
products.131 Using the preceding evidence, the appellate court found that at
least a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether
Appellants’ injuries were caused by foreseeable and intended uses of openuse PCB-containing products, and the trial court erred in granting summary

123

Id. at 312.
Id.
125
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953, 982, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941
P.2d 1203 (1997).
126
Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 312 (citing Rutherford, 16 Cal.4th at 982).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 313.
131
Id.
124

395

LINGERING HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
judgment for Pharmacia regarding Appellants’ cause of action for design
defect.132
On August 22, 2013, the “Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to
the Supreme Court” was denied, and on November 26, 2013, the
“Application for Transfer to the Supreme Court” was denied.133
V. COMMENT
This decision has enormous implications, and is the first of several
hundred cases moving forward from plaintiffs with non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma and an elevated level of PCBs in their bloodstream.134 According
to the press release submitted after the court of appeals decision, “[t]he case
represents the first time that injured victims have sought to hold a company
accountable for producing a chemical that has contaminated the entire planet,
including every person in the United States.”135 Though imposing a duty
could do little to prevent future harm from PCBs, this decision effectively
serves as a warning for manufacturers to be cautious in their design,
marketing, and production of potentially harmful products.136 The denial of
transfer and/or rehearing from the Missouri Supreme Court has hermetically
sealed the court of appeals decision from augmentation.
Large companies worldwide produce chemicals that are potentially
hazardous to human health, and they can no longer hide from liability under
the veils of ubiquity or product misuse. Should other courts adopt the rules
set by the court of appeals in Missouri, a country-wide standard may be set,
and it may even prompt federal action to determine new standards for
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products potentially harmful to human health. Though the court of appeals
did not discuss the application of this decision to other industries or products,
this case may be a springboard for other types of products liability claims, not
just chemically hazardous products.
It is a shame that the Supreme Court of Missouri denied the motion to
transfer the court of appeals decision. The Supreme Court may well have
further defined or constricted the standards to be met by producers of
potentially dangerous material. The Supreme Court could have deteriorated
the court of appeals decision, but in any case, the denial of transfer means
that the case is to be remanded to determine the issues of fact still present
using the rules the court of appeals has dictated.137
While public policy factors were used to determine whether an
exception from the general duty of ordinary care existed, the court of appeals
did not discuss the public policy factors of deciding a case of this magnitude.
While it is just to decide a case in a vacuum without external influences, the
court of appeals should have addressed or possibly lessened the likelihood
that courts could be flooded with plaintiffs from around the country citing
this case to recover from injuries occurring from products that were not
intended to be used by such a person. Companies now must be aware that
bystanders could bring a suit even if the consumer of a hazardous product
misused the product in a foreseeable way to cause harm to the bystander.
Product misuse, an affirmative defense, can now only be effective when the
misuse by the consumer is “so highly extraordinary as to be
unforeseeable.”138 Essentially, manufacturers of a dangerous product may
have little recourse if the plaintiff shows that his or her injuries stemmed
from a foreseeable misuse of the dangerous product. A court merely needs to
generally evaluate whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is
sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced.
Companies who have previously manufactured and sold hazardous
products must now be aware that they could be strictly liable for injuries
resulting from those products, even if they are banned or no longer on the
137
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market. Insurance policies may be purchased by companies creating
dangerous products to protect them from the possibility of huge legal claims.
As long as it was generally foreseeable by the producer that the design,
manufacture, and distribution of a hazardous product could result in a
plaintiff’s injuries, a company today may have to answer for its negligence in
the past. This could have significant ramifications for companies that
produce hazardous chemicals. An important aspect of this decision is that it
does not address the hazardous byproducts that result from the creation or
distribution of an otherwise safe product. Air pollution from refineries and
chemical plants is not subject to a products liability claim, so no redress may
be available for plaintiffs injured as a foreseeable consequence to the
pollution. The Clean Air Act may be an avenue for these types of plaintiffs,
and this case is perhaps the first step to a federal program to hold companies
liable for products that may be currently banned but continue to harm people.
The fact that this decision creates the possibility of legal liability for
actions a company took many years ago is troublesome, however. A
perfectly compliant company with a decades old creed of environmental
safety and responsibility could nonetheless be sued for reckless behavior
during the development of the company in the last century. The court of
appeals in Clair does not create a standard of strict liability, and many
findings of fact regarding the different Rowland factors must still be made to
hold a company liable. But a company may, nonetheless, be unable to escape
from the mistakes its predecessors made. The legal costs from paying a
seemingly endless list of plaintiffs along with the ensuing public
embarrassment and condemnation from consumers may well cost a company
its life upon the conclusion of a trial. Though this cost is not a primary
Rowland factor to be examined by a court, companies should continue to
lobby courts to give this factor more weight. Further, another factor that
could have been introduced by the court of appeals in Clair to add to the
Rowland factors is the company’s current and historical devotion to
environmental and consumer safety and protection. If this factor was
introduced, companies that have been doing the right thing for many years
may feel less fear from this ruling.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This case represents the first time that a company may be held liable
for producing a chemical that has potentially contaminated every person in
the United States. The Court of Appeals has created a new task for courts to
determine liability. No longer should a court decide whether a particular
plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular
defendant’s conduct. Now, a court must evaluate more generally whether the
category of negligent conduct is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of
harm experienced by the plaintiff. Once the foreseeability of harm due to the
negligent conduct is established, it is then the court’s task to determine
whether that conduct is appropriate for a general no-duty ruling. To
determine this, the court must use several public policy factors, including: the
gravity and likelihood of danger resulting from eliminating the duty, the
financial cost of improving the design, and the adverse consequences to the
product and to the consumer that would result from imposing a duty. This
case is among the first to claim that mere ubiquity in the market is not
sufficient to shield a company from liability due to the harmful effects of its
products.
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